> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://whitepaper.litho.ai/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://whitepaper.litho.ai/multx/docs/pinned_fallback_candidate.md).

# Pinned fallback amendment — unaccepted candidate

This candidate implements Autha G-01's five stated conditions. It is not an approval, deployment plan or authorization to configure any Safe.

For chains 1, 56 and 8453 only, the plan may explicitly use:

```json
{
  "fallbackHandler": "0xfd0732dc9e303f09fcef3a7388ad10a83459ec99",
  "fallbackHandlerRuntimeSha256": "8143b6ff3cf48028121244d88321907a1bddc24f1a6f12db01364511e816259a"
}
```

Both values are pinned in policy code. The verifier validates that policy, checks the Safe's slot, and fetches and hashes the handler runtime at the same verification block used for Safe state. Empty code is rejected. Modules remain empty and guard remains zero. No other nonzero handler/chain/hash is allowed.

The zero-handler option remains valid on all otherwise supported chains. It must omit fallbackHandlerRuntimeSha256. Existing deployment templates retain that option; operators must explicitly choose and obtain approval for the final configuration. No Base governance Safe is invented by this amendment.

The test fixture contains the 5637-byte runtime captured in the handler evidence review and matched to Safe's registry at commit 7b1fb6d615ab2d2999550ec9166554b180e813e5. Its source is Safe v1.4.1 CompatibilityFallbackHandler (LGPL-3.0-only), commit bf943f80fec5ac647159d26161446ac5d716a294; the licensed source archive accompanies the review package. Runtime hashes refer to decoded bytes, not the hex text.

Regression tests run through validateGovernancePolicy and verifyGovernance, including invalid chain/address/hash, missing hash, zero-handler metadata, runtime absence/drift, slot drift, modules and guard. Mutation checks remove individual checks and both policy call sites, plus the verifySafe call site. G-04's full deployment-verifier threshold regression remains included.

G-02 shared custody and G-03/O-12 governance risk decisions remain open. In particular EIP-1271 attestations can authorize third-party use at the Safe owner threshold without the bridge Timelock delay. This amendment does not connect Safe attestations to the bridge's ECDSA attestation mechanism.

The consolidated source includes all earlier developer candidates since accepted v0.9.2. Consolidation provides one source identity, not inherited acceptance. The LITHO-origin four-chain schema still requires a separately reviewed change for the client's ETH/BNB/Base-first deployment. Deployment stays disabled.
