> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://whitepaper.litho.ai/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://whitepaper.litho.ai/multx/docs/mainnet_deployment_package.md).

# MAINNET\_DEPLOYMENT\_PACKAGE

## v0.9.1 evidence additions

The approved plan and manifest now require `govTimelockRuntimeSha256`; independent bytecode evidence must include GovTimelock. Each chain's manifest records `governance.timelockDeploymentTxHash` and `timelockDeploymentBlock`. The plan's `governance.timelock` binds its deployer, exact proposer/executor/canceller/admin sets and zero constructor admin. The plan's `governance.safe` binds independently reviewed Safe 1.4.1 proxy/implementation hashes, implementation address, owners, threshold and acceptance URL. This release only permits no modules/guard/fallback.

Safe code hashes must come from independently retained reviewed implementation and proxy artifacts, not from copying unknown live code. These remain external approval inputs; do not treat example owners or test-fixture hashes as approved.

Both bridge bytecodes change to emit SupportedTokenSet. Regenerate evidence and use new paused deployments following focused audit closure. The verifier rejects old eventless token histories, incorrect Timelock constructors/roles and Safe state drift. Production signers additionally require an independently retained state-identity file and explicitly initialized journal (see signer runbook).

## MultX mainnet deployment package

Status: transaction-free preparation complete; deployment blocked.

This package prepares the audited LITHO 9005, Ethereum 1, BNB 56 and Base 8453 deployment without guessing governance, assets, caps, RPCs or custody inputs. It does not authorize a transaction. MultX and signer release signing remain disabled.

### Files

* `infra/mainnet-deployment-plan.template.json`: client/audit/governance intake record required before execution.
* `contracts/scripts/mainnet/validate-deployment-plan.js`: fail-closed plan validator; binds the plan to audited source/destination runtime hashes and rejects placeholders, wrong chains, non-5-of-7 signer sets, duplicate identities, missing approvals, unsafe governance separation and zero caps.
* `infra/mainnet-deployment-manifest.template.json`: sanitized post-deployment evidence record for addresses, transactions, blocks, runtime hashes, owners, guardians, exact signer sets, caps, assets and explicit token/target routes.
* `contracts/scripts/mainnet/validate-deployment-manifest.js`: rejects any incomplete, unpaused, unverified, unaudited-bytecode or cross-chain-inconsistent manifest.
* `contracts/scripts/mainnet/verify-deployment-readonly.js`: performs only RPC reads to independently bind the exact approved plan and bytecode-evidence files to the manifest, prove deployment transaction/creation-block provenance, chain IDs, runtime hashes, pause state, owners, guardians, an exact complete 5-of-7 signer set (including a live-count check), supported assets and routes, caps and wrapped-token origin/bridge roles. It refuses common signing-credential environment variables.
* `contracts/scripts/mainnet/generate-bytecode-evidence.js`: derives bridge and wrapped-token creation/runtime hashes, immutable-reference offsets, compiler version and settings directly from pinned Hardhat build information. The generated JSON is independently hashed and supplied to the verifier.
* `infra/network.mainnet.template.json`: API/indexer route manifest populated only from the validated deployment manifest.
* `infra/docker-compose.mainnet.template.yml`: non-runnable API/database template aligned with seven independent private VPS signer mTLS endpoints and an explicit trusted reverse-proxy hop for correct per-client rate limiting.

### Required sequence

1. Complete the independent contract and signer-protocol audit, remediation and fix review. Publish a new immutable audited release tag.
2. Obtain written approval for Safe/timelock/guardian/deployer/fee-payer addresses, seven bridge signer identities, 5-of-7 threshold, RPCs, confirmation depths, supported assets, base-unit caps and UTC window.
3. Copy `mainnet-deployment-plan.template.json` outside the public repository, complete it with evidence URLs only, and validate it:

   ```bash
   cd MultX/contracts
   node scripts/mainnet/validate-deployment-plan.js --plan /secure/path/plan.json
   ```
4. Independently review the plan and record its SHA-256. No deployer key may be loaded before this gate passes.
5. Use a separately reviewed audited-release deployment implementation during the approved window. The historical `deploy.js` and `03-deploy-dest-chain.js` scripts are testnet-only and must not be used for mainnet.
6. Deploy governance first and bridges paused. Deploy only approved wrapped assets, grant only the approved bridge role, set caps, explicitly enable only approved token/target routes, and keep everything paused.
7. Complete and validate `mainnet-deployment-manifest.template.json`:

   ```bash
   node scripts/mainnet/validate-deployment-manifest.js \
     --manifest /secure/path/deployment-manifest.json
   ```
8. Run the transaction-free RPC verification from an environment containing no mnemonic or private key:

   ```bash
   node scripts/mainnet/verify-deployment-readonly.js \
     --plan /secure/path/approved-plan.json \
     --manifest /secure/path/deployment-manifest.json \
     --bytecode-evidence /secure/path/audited-bytecode-evidence.json \
     --confirm-transaction-free
   ```
9. Commit only the sanitized validated manifest. Store private RPC credentials, custody data, TLS private keys and infrastructure inventory in the protected secret manager/private infrastructure repository.
10. Configure API routes and signer policies from that manifest, leave release signing disabled, and request a separate production-canary approval.

### Stop conditions

Stop immediately on any audit mismatch, placeholder, wrong chain ID, different runtime hash, unpaused bridge, owner/guardian collision, signer-set drift, unapproved asset, zero/different cap, missing source verification or window mismatch. Do not repair evidence by hand after a transaction; pause, preserve records and use the approved rollback/change-control process.
